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ABSTRACT
Despite recent advances in deep learning, there is still a significant gap between therobustness of human perception and machine intelligence. Deep learning is notprovably secure. In fact, deep neural networks are vulnerable to security attacks
from malicious adversaries, which is an ongoing and critical challenge for deep learning
researchers. Even innocuous perturbations in training data can change the way a deep
network behaves in unintended ways. This means that imperceptibly and immeasurably
small departures from the training data can result in a completely different label
classification when using the model for supervised deep learning.
In this thesis, we explore adversarial deep learning algorithms. We examine how
they exploit vulnerabilities in deep networks and how to make deep networks robust
to their attacks. To explore the vulnerabilities, we simulate various model training
processes under a range of various attack scenarios. Each attack strategy is assumed to
be formulated by an intelligent adversary that is capable of either feature manipulation,
label manipulation, or both. The optimal attack policy of our adversaries is determined
by the solution for optimization problems that output the adversarial data. We then
apply the knowledge that we learned to improve and reinforce the learning procedure so
as to better defend against attacks.
As part of this research process, we developed new adversarial learning algorithms
to solve for adversarial manipulations in supervised classification networks such as
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). The adversarial learning objective for our
adversaries is to inject small changes into the data distributions, defined over positive
and negative class labels, to the extent that the CNN subsequently misclassifies the
data distribution. Thus, the theoretical goal of our deep learning process becomes one of
determining whether a manipulation of the input data has reached a learner decision
boundary, i.e., where too many positive labels have become negative labels. We began
this research undertaking by first studying the performance vulnerabilities in CNNs.
With these vulnerabilities identified, we were able to propose CNNs that are secure to
those types of adversarial attacks.
We generate adversarial data by solving for optimal attack policies in Stackelberg
games where adversaries target the misclassification performance of CNNs. In a se-
quential game-theoretic formulation, we model the interaction between an intelligent
adversary and a deep learning model (a CNN) to generate adversarial manipulations by
solving a two-player sequential noncooperative Stackelberg game where each player’s
payoff function increases with interactions to a local optimum. With a stochastic game-
i
theoretic formulation, we then extend the two-player Stackelberg game into a multiplayer
Stackelberg game with stochastic payoff functions for the adversaries. Both versions of
the game are resolved through the Nash equilibrium, which refers to a pair of strategies
in which there is no incentive for either the learner or the adversary to deviate from
their optimal strategy. In this case, the strategy pair is a learner weight and an evo-
lutionary operation. In addition, we devised each attack scenario as a blackbox attack
where the adversaries have no prior knowledge of the CNN’s learning processes and its
best response strategies. In each case, we show that the Nash equilibrium leads to a
supervised classification network that is robust to subsequent data manipulation by a
game-theoretic adversary.
We then explore adversaries who optimise variational payoff functions via data
randomisation strategies on CNNs designed for multilabel classification tasks. Similarly,
the outcome of these investigations is an algorithm design that solves a variable-sum
two-player sequential Stackelberg game with new Nash equilibria. In designing the
attack scenarios, the adversarial objective was to make small, undetectable changes to
the test data. The adversary manipulates variational parameters in the input data to
mislead the learning process of the CNN, so it misclassifies the original class labels as
the targeted class labels. Our ideal variational adversarial manipulation is the minimum
change needed to the adversarial cost function of encoded data that will result in the
CNN incorrectly labelling the decoded data.
The resulting attack algorithms were a Simulated Annealing (SA) algorithm and an
Alternating Least Squares (ALS) algorithm, which optimise the data manipulations by
stochastically searching the strategy spaces of the variational adversaries. The optimal
manipulations are found by solving the Nash equilibria optimization problem of the
proposed Stackelberg game. Specifically, the optimal attack parameters in ALS and SA
solve for the (variational nonlinear non-convex) adversarial cost functions that generate
adversarial data. The payoff function for the variational adversary depends on the
manipulations determined by a Variational Autoencoder (VAE), while the payoff function
for the CNN classifier is evaluated in the input data space.
The adversarial data generated by this variant of the Stackelberg games simulates
continuous interactions with the classifier’s learning processes as opposed to one-time
interactions. To evaluate CNN performance, we assessed the adversarial algorithms over
different strategy spaces proposed for the MNIST handwritten digits database and the
VGGFace2 database of human faces.
The original CNN model was then retrained using all the adversarial manipula-
tions generated by the game-theoretic adversaries to create a secure CNN model. In
an empirical demonstration, we show that the new secure CNN model is robust to
subsequent game-theoretic data manipulation by adversaries. This promising result sug-
gests that evolutionary algorithms based on game-theoretic modelling and mathematical
optimization are significantly better approach to building more secure deep learning
models.
We also empirically demonstrate that variational adversaries are also able to mislead
CNNs. In these cases, the learning process of the CNNs was manipulated by an adversary
at the input data level as well as the generated data. The optimal manipulations were
ii
to stochastic optima in non-convex best responses strategies. We were able to encode
the resulting adversarial data in terms of the multivariate statistical parameters of a
Gaussian mixture model. We then retrained the original CNN on the manipulated data
to give rise to a secure CNN that is robust to subsequent performance vulnerabilities
from variational adversaries.
In applying this research, we developed a deep network model that discovers Granger
causes in multivariate temporal financial market data. The model comprises a deep
neural network (DNN) and a recurrent neural network (RNN) and discovers Granger-
causal features with bivariate regression from bivariate time series data distributions.
These features are subsequently used to discover Granger-causal graphs for multivariate
regression on multivariate time series data distributions. Our supervised feature learning
process with these proposed deep regression networks returned favourable F-tests
for feature selection and t-tests against comparisons with other models. Moreover, a
regression analysis on a set of experiments with real stock market data from Yahoo
Finance demonstrates that our causal features are a significant improvement over the
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